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This paper examines the optimal response of monetary and fiscal policy to a decline in aggregate demand.
The theoretical framework is a two-period general equilibrium model in which prices are sticky in
the short run and flexible in the long run. Policy is evaluated by how well it raises the welfare of the
representative household. While the model has Keynesian features, its policy prescriptions differ significantly
from textbook Keynesian analysis. Moreover, the model suggests that the commonly used "bang for
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What is the optimal response of monetary and ﬁscal policy to an economy-wide decline in aggregate demand?
This question has been at the forefront of many economists’ minds over the past several years. In the
aftermath of the 2008-2009 housing bust, ﬁnancial crisis, and stock market decline, households and ﬁrms
were less eager to spend. The decline in the aggregate demand for goods and services led to the most severe
recession in a generation or more.
The textbook answer to such a situation is for policymakers to use the tools of monetary and ﬁscal policy
to prop up aggregate demand. And, indeed, during this recent episode, the Federal Reserve reduced the
federal funds rate–its primary policy instrument–almost all the way to zero. With monetary policy having
used up its ammunition of interest rate cuts, economists and policymakers increasingly looked elsewhere for
a solution. In particular, they focused on ﬁscal policy and unconventional instruments of monetary policy.
Traditional Keynesian economics suggests a startlingly simple solution: The government can increase its
spending to make up for the shortfall in private spending. Indeed, this was one of the motivations for the
stimulus package proposed by President Obama and passed by Congress in early 2009. The logic behind
this policy should be familiar to anyone who has taken a macroeconomics principles course anytime over the
past half century.
Yet many Americans (including quite a few congressional Republicans) are skeptical that increased gov-
ernment spending is the right policy response. They are motivated by some basic economic and political
questions: If we as individual citizens are feeling poorer and cutting back on our spending, why should our
elected representatives in eﬀect reverse these private decisions by increasing spending and going into debt
on our behalf? If the goal of government is to express the collective will of the citizenry, shouldn’t it follow
the lead of those it represents by tightening its own belt?
Traditional Keynesians have a standard answer to this line of thinking. According to the paradox of
thrift, increased saving may be individually rational but collectively irrational. As individuals try to save
more, they depress aggregate demand and thus national income. In the end, saving might not increase at
all. Increased thrift might lead only to depressed economic activity, a malady that can be remedied by an
increase in government purchases of goods and services.
The goal of this paper is to address this set of issues in light of modern macroeconomic theory. Unlike
traditional Keynesian analysis of ﬁscal policy, modern macro theory begins with the preferences and con-
straints facing households and ﬁrms and builds from there. This feature of modern theory is not a mere fetish
for microeconomic foundations. Instead, it allows policy prescriptions to be founded on the basic principles
of welfare economics. This feature seems particularly important for the case at hand, because the Keynesian
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behalf. Figuring out whether such a policy can improve the well-being of those citizens is the key issue, a
task that seems impossible to address without some reliable measure of welfare.
The model we develop to address this question ﬁts solidly in the new Keynesian tradition. That is, the
starting point for the analysis is an intertemporal general equilibrium model with prices that are assumed
to be sticky in the short run. This temporary price rigidity prevents the economy from reaching an optimal
allocation of resources, and it gives a possible role for monetary and ﬁscal policy to help the economy
reach a better allocation through their inﬂuence on aggregate demand. The model yields several signiﬁcant
conclusions about the best responses of policymakers under various economic conditions and constraints on
the set of policy tools at their disposal.
To be sure, by the nature of this kind of exercise, the validity of any conclusion depends on whether
the model captures the essence of the problem being examined. Because all models are simpliﬁcations,
one can always question whether a conclusion is robust to generalization. Our strategy is to begin with a
simple model that illustrates our approach and yields some stark results. We then generalize this baseline
model along several dimensions both to check robustness and to examine a broader range of policy issues.
Inevitably, policy conclusions from such a theoretical exploration must be tentative. In the ﬁnal section, we
discuss some of the simpliﬁc a t i o n sw em a k et h a tm i g h tb er e l a x e di nf u t u r ew o r k .
Our baseline model is a two-period general equilibrium model with sticky prices in the ﬁrst period. The
available policy tools are monetary policy and government purchases of goods and services. Like private
consumption goods, government purchases yield utility to households. Private and public consumption are
not, however, perfect substitutes. Our goal is to examine the optimal use of the tools of monetary and ﬁscal
policy when the economy ﬁnds itself producing below potential because of insuﬃcient aggregate demand.
We begin with the benchmark case in which the economy does not face the zero lower bound for nominal
interest rates. In this case, the only stabilization tool that is necessary is conventional monetary policy.
Once monetary policy is set to maintain full employment, the ﬁscal policy that maximizes the representa-
tive household’s welfare is based on classical principles of cost-beneﬁt analysis. In particular, government
consumption is set to equate its marginal beneﬁt with the marginal beneﬁt of private consumption. As a
result, when private citizens are cutting back on their private consumption spending, the government cuts
back on public consumption as well.
We then examine the complications that arise because nominal interest rates cannot be set below zero.
We show that even this constraint on monetary policy does not by itself give a role for traditional ﬁscal policy
as a stabilization tool. Instead, the optimal policy is for the central bank to commit to future monetary
policy actions in order to increase current aggregate demand. Fiscal policy continues to be set on classical
3principles.
A role for countercyclical ﬁscal policy might potentially arise if the central bank both hits the zero lower
bound on the current short-term interest rate and is unable to commit itself to expansionary future policy.
In this case, monetary policy cannot maintain full-employment of productive resources on its own. Absent
any ﬁscal policy, the economy would ﬁnd itself in a non-classical short-run equilibrium. Optimal ﬁscal policy
then looks decidedly Keynesian. If the only instrument of ﬁscal policy is the level of government purchases,
optimal policy is to increase those purchases to increase the demand for idle productive resources, even if
the marginal value of the public goods being purchased is low.
This very Keynesian result, however, is overturned once the set of ﬁscal tools available to policymakers is
expanded. Optimal ﬁscal policy in this situation is the one that tries to replicate the allocation of resources
t h a tw o u l db ea c h i e v e di fp r i c e sw e r eﬂexible. An increase in government purchases cannot accomplish that
goal: While it can yield the same level of national income, it cannot achieve the same composition of it. We
discuss how tax instruments might be used to induce a better allocation of resources. The model suggests
that tax policy should aim at increasing the level of investment spending. Something like an investment tax
credit comes to mind. In essence, optimal ﬁscal policy in this situation tries to produce incentives similar to
what would be achieved if the central bank were somehow able to reduce interest rates below zero.
A ﬁnal implication of the baseline model is that the traditional ﬁscal policy multiplier may well be a
poor tool for evaluating the welfare implications of alternative ﬁscal policies. It is common in policy circles
to judge alternative stabilization ideas using “bang-for-the-buck” calculations. That is, ﬁscal options are
judged according to how many dollars of extra GDP are achieved for each dollar of extra deﬁcit spending.
But such calculations ignore the composition of GDP and, therefore, are potentially misleading as measures
of welfare.
After developing these results in our baseline model, we examine three variations on it. First, we add
a third period to the model. We show how the central bank can use long-term interest rates as an addi-
tional tool to achieve the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Second, we add government investment spending to
the baseline model. We show that all government expenditure follows classical principles when monetary
policy is suﬃcient to stabilize output. Moreover, even when monetary policy is limited, the model does not
point toward government investment as a particularly useful tool for putting idle resources to work. Third,
we modify the baseline model to include non-Ricardian, rule-of-thumb households who consume a constant
fraction of income. The presence of such households means that the timing of taxes may aﬀect output, and
we characterize the optimal policy mix in that setting. We ﬁnd that the description of the equilibrium closely
resembles the traditional Keynesian model, but the prescription for optimal policy can diﬀer substantially
from the textbook answer.
42 Introducing the Model
In this section we introduce the elements of the baseline model. Before delving into the model’s details, it
may be useful to describe how this model is related to a few other models with which readers may be familiar.
Our goal is not to provide a completely new model of stabilization policy but rather to illustrate conventional
mechanisms in a way that permits an easier and more transparent analysis of the welfare implications of
alternative policies.
First, the model is closely related to the model of short-run ﬂuctuations found in most leading under-
graduate textbooks. Our students are taught that prices are sticky in the short run but ﬂexible in the long
run. As a result, the economy can temporarily deviate from its full-employment equilibrium, yet over time
it gravitates toward full employment. Similarly, we will (in a later section) impose a sticky price level in
period one, but allow future prices to be ﬂexible.
Second, this model is closely related to the large literature on dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. Strictly speaking, the model is not stochastic: We will solve for the deterministic path of
the economy after one (or more) of the exogenous variables changes. But the spirit of the model is much the
same. As in DSGE models, all decisions are founded on underlying preferences and technology. Moreover,
all decision makers are forward-looking, so their actions will depend not only on current policy but also on
policy they expect to prevail in the future.
There is a key methodological diﬀerence between our approach and that in the DSGE literature. In
recent years, the DSGE literature has evolved in the direction of greater complexity, as researchers have
attempted to match various moments of the data more closely. (See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans 2005 and Smets and Wouters 2003). By contrast, our goal is greater simplicity and transparency
so the welfare implications of alternative monetary and ﬁscal policies can be better illuminated.
Third, the model we examine is related to the older literature on “general disequilibrium” models, such
as Barro and Grossman (1971) and Malinvaud (1977). As in these models, we will assume that the price
level in the ﬁrst period is exogenously stuck at a level that is inconsistent with full employment of productive
resources. At the prevailing price level, there will be an excess supply of goods. But unlike this earlier
literature, the model is explicitly dynamic. That is, we emphasize the role of forward-looking, intertemporal
behavior in determining current spending decisions and the impact of policy.
52.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households. The representative household has the
following objective function:
max{(1)+(1)+ [(2)+(2)]} (1)
where  is consumption,  is government purchases, and  is the discount factor. Households choose
consumption, but they take government purchases as given.
Households derive all their income from their ownership of ﬁrms. Each household’s consumption choices
are limited by a present value budget constraint:
1 (Π1 − 1 − 1)+
2 (Π2 − 2 − 2)
(1 + 1)
=0  (2)
where  is the price level in period , Π are proﬁts of the ﬁrm,  are tax payments, and 1 is the nominal
interest rate between period one and two. Implicit in this budget constraint is the assumption of a bond
market in which households can borrow or lend at the market interest rate.
2.2 Firms
Firms do all the production in the economy and provide all household income. It is easiest to imagine that
the number of ﬁrms is the same as the number of households and that each household owns one ﬁrm.
For simplicity, we assume that capital  is the only factor of production. Each period, the ﬁrm produces
output with an  production function, where  is an exogenous technological parameter. The ﬁrm begins
with an endowment of capital 1 and is able to borrow and lend in ﬁnancial markets to determine the future
capital stock 2. Without loss of generality, we assume capital fully depreciates each period, so investment
in period one equals the capital stock in period two.
The parameter  plays a key role in our analysis. In particular, we are interested in studying the optimal
policy response to a decline in aggregate demand. In our model, the most natural cause of a decline in
aggregate demand is a decrease in the future value of . Such an event can be described as a decline in
expected growth, a fall in conﬁdence, or a pessimistic shock to “animal spirits.” In any event, in our model,
it will tend to reduce wealth and current aggregate demand, as well as reducing the natural rate of interest
(that is, the real interest rate consistent with full employment). A similar set of events would unfold if
the shock were to households’ discount factor , but it seems more natural to assume stable household
preferences and changes in the expected technology available to ﬁrms.
6Before proceeding, it might be worth commenting on the absence of a labor input in the model. That
omission is not crucial. As we will describe more fully later, it could be remedied by giving each household
an endowment of labor in each period and by making the simplifying assumption that capital and labor
are perfect substitutes in production. That somewhat more general model yields identical results regarding
monetary and ﬁscal policy. Therefore, to keep the results as clean and easily interpretable as possible, we
will focus on the one-factor case.









where the second period’s nominal proﬁt is discounted by the nominal interest rate. Proﬁts are:
Π =  −  (3)
where  is equilibrium aggregate output and  is investment. Because capital fully depreciates each period,
investment in period one becomes the capital stock in period two:
2 = 1 (4)
Recall that the initial capital stock 1 is given. Also, because there is no third period, there is no investment
in the second period (2 =0 ) .
As noted above, the production function is
( )=
with   0.
Finally, it is important to note an assumption implicit in this statement of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem:
The ﬁrm is assumed to sell all of its output at the going price, and it is assumed to buy investment goods
at the going price. In particular, the ﬁrm is not permitted to produce capital for itself, nor is it allowed to
produce consumption goods directly for the household that owns it. This restriction is irrelevant in the case
of fully ﬂexible prices, but it will matter in the case of sticky prices, where ﬁrms may be demand-constrained.
In that case, this assumption prevents the ﬁrm from directly circumventing the normal ineﬃciencies that arise
from sticky prices. In practice, such a restriction arises naturally because ﬁrms are specialists in producing
highly diﬀerentiated goods. Because we do not formally incorporate product diﬀerentiation in our analysis,
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2.3 The Money Market and Monetary Policy
Households are required to hold money to purchase consumption goods. The money market in this economy
is assumed to be described by the quantity equation:
M = 
That is, money holdings are proportional to nominal consumer spending. The parameter  reﬂects the
eﬃciency of the monetary system; a small  implies a large velocity of money. We tend to think of  as
being very small, which is why we ignore the cost of holding money in the households’ budget constraint
above. The limiting case as  approaches zero is sometimes called a “cashless” economy.





which implies the conventional money market equilibrium condition
 = 
 can be interpreted either as the money supply adjusted for the money demand parameter  or as the
determinant of nominal consumer spending.
Money earns a nominal rate of return of zero. When the nominal interest rate on bonds is positive,
money is a dominated asset, and households will hold only what is required for transactions purposes, as
determined above. However, they could choose to hold more (in which case   ). This possibility
prevents the nominal interest rate in the bond market from falling below zero.
Because there are two periods, there are two policy variables to be set by the central bank. In the ﬁrst
period, the central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate 1, subject to the zero lower bound.
It allows that period’s money supply 1 to adjust to whatever is demanded in the economy’s equilibrium.
In the second period, the central bank sets the money supply 2. (Recall that there is no interest rate in
period two, because there is no period three.) We can think of the current interest rate 1 as the central
bank’s short-run policy instrument and the future money supply 2 as the long-run nominal anchor.
82.4 Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in each period is described by two variables:  is government purchases in period ,a n d is
lump-sum tax revenue. (In a later section, we introduce an investment subsidy as an additional ﬁscal policy





Any deﬁcits are funded by borrowing in the bond market at the market interest rate. The government’s
budget constraint is:
1 (1 − 1)+
2 (2 − 2)
1+1
=0  (6)
Note that because households are forward-looking and have the same time horizon at the government, this
model will be fully Ricardian: the timing of tax payments is neutral. In a later section, we will generalize
the model to include some non-Ricardian behavior.
2.5 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
Output is used for consumption, investment, and government purchases:
 =  +  +  (7)
Equilibrium aggregate output is also constrained by potential output:
 ≤  (8)
In the full-employment equilibrium, this last equation holds with equality. However, we are particularly
interested in cases in which this equation holds as a strict inequality. In these cases, aggregate demand is
insuﬃcient to employ all productive resources, and monetary and ﬁscal policy can potentially remedy the
problem. The key issue is the optimal use of these policy tools.
3 The Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
The natural place to start in analyzing the model is to consider the behavior of the ﬁrms and households,
as well as optimal policy, for the case of ﬂexible prices. The ﬂexible-price equilibrium will provide the
benchmark when we impose sticky prices in the next section.
93.1 Firm and Household Behavior
We ﬁrst derive the equations characterizing the equilibrium decisions of the private sector (households and
ﬁrms), taking government policy as given.
Let’s start with ﬁrms. In this setting, prices adjust to guarantee full employment in each period. There-
fore,
 =  for all .( 9 )
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem can be restated, using the full-employment condition (9) and the















Expression (10) is similar to a conventional Fisher equation: the nominal interest rate reﬂects the marginal
productivity of capital and the equilibrium inﬂation rate.







The full-employment condition (9) and accounting identity (7) imply the following values for consumption:
1 = 11 − 2 − 1 (12)
2 = 22 − 2 (13)
The four equations (10) through (13) simultaneously determine the equilibrium for four endogenous variables:
1, 2, 2,a n d21. The second-period money-market equilibrium condition (2 = 22)t h e np i n s
down 2 and thereby 1.









where  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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2 =
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Note that the economy exhibits monetary neutrality. That is, the monetary policy instruments do not
aﬀect any of the real variables. Expansionary monetary policy–as reﬂe c t e di ne i t h e rl o w e r1 or higher
2–implies a higher price level 1.
As already mentioned, we are interested in studying the eﬀects of a decline in aggregate demand. Most
naturally, such a shock can be thought of as some exogenous event leading to a decline in the private
sector’s desire to spend. There are various ways in which such a shock can be incorporated into this kind
of model. One often used option is to assume a shock to the intertemporal discount rate (which here would
be an increase in ). Alternatively, a decline in spending desires can arise because of a decrease in 2,t h e
productivity of technology projected to prevail in the future. The impact of 2 on current demand depends
crucially on , which in turn governs the relative size of income and substitution eﬀects from a change in
the rate of return. If 1 income eﬀects dominate substitution eﬀects, and a lower 2 primarily causes
households to feel poorer, inducing a reduction in desired consumption. Hereafter, we focus on the case of
11a decline in 2 together with the maintained assumption that 1. This is, of course, not the only way
one might model shocks to aggregate demand, but we believe it is the closest approximation in this model
to what one might call a decline in conﬁdence or an adverse shift in “animal spirits.”
Equations (14) to (21) above show what a decline in 2 does to all the endogenous variables in the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Consumption falls because households are poorer. Higher saving translates into
higher investment. Output in the ﬁrst period remains the same. The ﬂexibility of the price level is crucial
for this result. Equation (19) shows that a fall in 2 leads to a fall in the price level 1. In a later section,
we will examine the case in which the price level is sticky and thus unable to respond to this shock.
3.2 Optimal Fiscal Policy under Flexible Prices
Optimal ﬁscal policy follows classical principles. We state the government’s optimization problem formally
in a later section, but in words it chooses public expenditure  and taxes  to maximize household utility
subject to the economy’s feasibility and the government’s budget constraints. The following conditions deﬁne
optimal government purchases:
0 (1)=20 (2) (22)
0 ()=0 () for all  (23)
Result (23) shows that optimal ﬁscal policy has government purchases move in the same direction as private
consumption, unless there is a change in preferences for government services.
To derive explicit solutions, we assume that the utility from government purchases takes a similar form









where  is a taste parameter. These expressions imply optimal government purchases:
1 = 1
2 = 2










































































This ﬂexible-price equilibrium with optimal ﬁscal policy will be a natural benchmark in the analysis that
follows.
3.3 An Aside on Labor
As mentioned earlier, it is possible to incorporate labor as an additional factor of production without aﬀecting
the key results of the model. Suppose that the production function is
 =  ( + )
where  is an exogenous labor productivity parameter and  is the exogenous level of labor supplied
inelastically to the ﬁrm by the representative household. With this production function, the baseline model
is more cumbersome but little changed. In essence, current and future labor inputs serve as additions to the
initial productive endowment of the household, funding consumption and government purchases just as does
1. None of the policy analysis would be altered by adding labor input in this way. Interested readers are
referred to a technical appendix available both at the Brookings’ Papers website and at the authors’ personal
websites.
If labor and capital were not perfect substitutes in production, contrary to what is assumed in the above
production function, more details about factor markets would need to be speciﬁed. In particular, ﬁrms facing
insuﬃcient demand would have to choose between idle labor and idle capital in some way. We suspect that
this issue is largely unrelated to the topics at hand, so we avoid these additional complexities. Hereafter, we
maintain the assumption of a single input into production.
134 The Equilibrium under Short-run Sticky Prices
So far we have introduced a two-period general equilibrium model with monetary and ﬁscal policy and solved
for the equilibrium under the assumption that prices are ﬂexible in both periods. In this section, we use the
model to analyze what happens if prices are sticky in the short run. In particular, we take the short-run
price level 1 to be ﬁxed, while allowing the long-run price level 2 to remain ﬂexible.
The cause for the price stickiness will not be modeled here, and the reason for the deviation of prices from
equilibrium prices will not enter our analysis. It seems natural to imagine that prices were set in advance
based on economic conditions that were expected to prevail and that conditions turned out diﬀerently than
expected. Equation (19) shows what determines the price level consistent with full employment. If any of
the exogenous variables in this equation are other than what was anticipated, and the price level is unable
to change, the economy will be forced to deviate from the classical ﬂexible-price equilibrium. One notable
possibility, for instance, is ﬂuctuations in 2, which we have interpreted as reﬂecting conﬁdence about future
economic growth.
With a ﬁxed price level, there are two cases to consider: the price level can be stuck too low, or it can
be stuck too high. If the price level is too low, the goods market will experience excess demand. Such
a situation is sometimes called “repressed inﬂation.” If the price level is too high, the goods market will
experience excess supply. In this case, which might be called the “Keynesian regime,” ﬁrms will be unable
to sell all they want at the going price and so some productive resources will be left idle. Because our goal
is to understand optimal policy during recessions, our analysis will focus on this latter case.1
Formally, the equations describing the sticky-price equilibrium closely resemble equations (9) through
(13) from the ﬂexible-price model. One diﬀerence is that because nominal rigidity prevents full employment
of capital in period one, equation (9)  =  may not hold for  =1  Moreover, 11 needs to be
replaced with 1 in equation (12), which now becomes
1 = 1 − 2 − 1
Of course, the presence of a sticky price level in period one breaks the monetary neutrality of the ﬂexible
price model. Here, monetary policy aﬀects the real economy’s equilibrium quantities.










1As an aside, we note that much of the new Keynesian literature makes this case canonical, and precludes the case of
repressed inﬂation, by assuming monopolistic competition. Firms in such industries charge prices above marginal cost and, as
































Equation (34) can be viewed as an aggregate demand curve. It yields a negative relationship between the
output 1 and the price level 1.
This set of equations also yields another famous Keynesian result: the paradox of thrift. If  rises, house-
holds want to consume less and save more. In equilibrium, however, saving and investment are unchanged,
because output falls. That is, because aggregate demand inﬂuences output, more thriftiness does not increase
equilibrium saving.




Expression (37) succinctly captures the policy position of the central bank. It also hints at our ﬁndings
detailed below, where we show that the various tools available to the central bank can act as substitutes.
In this setting, the monetary policy that generates full employment can be read directly from (34) by










2 (1 − 2)
(11 − 1) (38)
To maintain full employment, monetary policy needs to respond to present and future technology, present
and future ﬁscal policy, and household preferences.
To illustrate the implications of this solution, consider the impact of a negative shock to future technology
2. (We maintain the assumption that 1). In the absence of a policy response, the eﬀect on the economy’s
short-run equilibrium can be seen immediately from equations (31) through (36). Consumption falls in both
periods. Output falls in period two, even though the economy is at full employment, as worse technology
reduces potential output in that period. Most important for our purposes, output falls in the ﬁrst period
15due to weak aggregate demand. Potential output in period one is unchanged because 1 and 1 are ﬁxed.
Thus, a decline in “conﬁdence” as reﬂected in 2 causes resources in period one to become idle.
5 Optimal Policy when Monetary Policy is Suﬃcient to Restore
the Flexible-Price Equilibrium
In this section, we begin to examine optimal policy responses to a drop in aggregate demand. For concreteness,
we focus on a negative shock to future technology 2. Formally, let a hat over a variable denote the value
of that variable anticipated when prices were set. We assume that the price level was set to achieve full
employment based on an expected value ˆ 2, but once prices are set, the actual realized value is 2,w h e r e
2  ˆ 2. We begin with conventional monetary policy, where the central bank adjusts the short-term
nominal interest rate, and derive the threshold value for 2 above which conventional monetary policy is
suﬃcient to replicate the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. We also characterize optimal ﬁscal policy in this scenario.
Then, we examine the options for monetary policy when 2 falls further and the economy hits the zero lower
bound.
Whenever monetary policy is suﬃcient to restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, optimal ﬁscal policy
follows classical principles, satisfying expression (23) from the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Therefore, the





























































In our canonical case in which 1, a fall in 2 raises the right-hand side of this expression. Thus, a decline
in conﬁdence about the future causes optimal monetary to be more expansionary, as reﬂected in either a fall
in short-term interest rate 1 or an increase in the future money supply 2.
5.1 Conventional Monetary Policy
The conventional monetary policy response to weak aggregate demand is to lower the short-term nominal
interest rate 1. For now, assume that this conventional response is the central bank’s only response, so that
the long-term money supply remains at its pre-shock level (i.e., 2 = ˆ 2). Fiscal policy is at its classical
optimum derived above. With these assumptions, we can rearrange result (46) and substitute it along with

















⎦ (1 +ˆ 1)
(1 + 1)
11 (47)
Manipulating expression (47) yields a threshold value for 2 above which conventional policy is suﬃcient to



















Note that a higher initial value of ˆ 1 implies a lower threshold 2|. This result parallels much
recent discussion suggesting that higher normal levels of nominal interest rates would increase the scope for
conventional monetary responses to adverse demand shocks. (See, e.g., Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro
2010.) To show this clearly, note that if ˆ 1 =0this expression reduces to:
2| = ˆ 2
That is, if the nominal interest rate is normally zero, then conventional monetary policy has no power in
response to an adverse shock.

















⎦(1 +ˆ 1) (49)
At this value of the interest rate, consumption, investment, and output all equal their values in the ﬂexible-
price equilibrium.
The limiting case in which  approaches zero may be instructive. In this case, the interest rate needed






(1 +ˆ 1) (50)
Thus, when our measure of conﬁdence 2 falls below what was anticipated when prices were set, the gross
nominal interest rate must move in the same direction. How far 2 can fall before the central bank hits the
zero lower bound depends solely on the normal interest rate ˆ 1.
5.2 Long-term Monetary Expansion
If 2 falls below 2|, the central bank will be unable to obtain the ﬂexible-price equilibrium
with conventional monetary policy. As recent events have shown, monetary authorities may look beyond
conventional policy in this situation. One much-discussed option is to try to aﬀect the long-term nominal
interest rate. We consider that option in a later section, where we specify a variation on this baseline model
in which the economy has three periods, not two.
In this baseline model, the central bank has one tool other than the short-term interest rate: the long-
term level of money supply 2. Condition (42) implies that any shock to future technology can be fully
oﬀset by changes to 2. Formally, the 2 required to restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium after the shock














Note that the right hand side of (51) is decreasing in 2, so that (as expected) a large negative shock to
future technology calls for a long-term nominal expansion.2
2The role of future monetary policy in inﬂuencing the short-run equilibrium has, of course, been widely discussed. See, for
example, Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
185.3 Summary when Monetary Policy is Unrestricted
As u ﬃciently ﬂexible and credible monetary policy is always suﬃcient to stabilize output following an adverse
demand shock, even if the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rate binds. Once monetary policy
has restored the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, the role of ﬁscal policy is entirely passive and is determined by
classical principles that equate the marginal utility of government purchases to the marginal utility of private
consumption.
One noteworthy, and perhaps surprising, result concerns the inﬂuence of these expansionary moves in
monetary policy on inﬂation. In this model, the current price level 1 is ﬁxed, but equation (36) shows how
monetary policy inﬂuences the future price level 2. A cut in the interest rate 1 reduces the future price
level. The explanation is that the lower interest rate stimulates investment and increases future potential
output; for any given future money supply 2, higher potential output means a lower price level. Similarly,
an increase in future money 2 does not raise the future price level because it stimulates current output
and investment; the increase in future potential output oﬀsets the inﬂationary pressure of a greater money
supply. Thus, while the various tools of monetary policy can increase aggregate demand and output in this
economy, they do not increase future inﬂation until the economy reaches full employment.
Of course, as has been made clear in recent debates over U.S. monetary policy, the ability of the central
bank to fulﬁll its potential is vulnerable to real-world constraints on policymaking. The central bank may
not be willing or able to commit to the expansionary long-term money supply 2 that is required for
stabilization. As a consequence, monetary policy may be insuﬃcient to restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium,
raising the question of whether and how ﬁscal policy might supplement it. We turn to that question in the
next section.
6 Optimal Fiscal Policy when Monetary Policy is Restricted
Imagine an economy that had been hit by an adverse shock to 2. The central bank has set 1 =0 , but
that policy move has been insuﬃcient to restore output to full employment. In addition, the central bank is,
for some reason, unable to commit to an expansion in the future money supply 2. (In the notation of the
previous section, this implies 2  2|, 1 =0 ,a n d2 = ˆ 2.) How might ﬁscal policy respond
to such a scenario?
We consider two ﬁscal stimulus policies in this section, each intended to raise one of the components of
aggregate demand. First, we consider an increase in 1 government purchases in the ﬁrst period. Second,
we examine a subsidy  aimed at boosting investment 1. Both of these policies are ﬁnanced by increased
19lump-sum taxes. The timing of these taxes is immaterial because we have assumed all households are
forward-looking. In a later section, we relax the assumption of completely forward-looking households.
As the households in that example choose consumption in part based on a rule of thumb tied to current
disposable income, adjusting the timing of taxes has the potential to raise consumption 1.3
6.1 The Government’s Fiscal Policy Problem





where  i sa ni n v e s t m e n ts u b s i d ys ot h a tt h ec o s to fo n eu n i to fi n v e s t m e n tt oaﬁrm in period one is (1 − ),
and the values for {1 2 2} as a function of government policies are chosen optimally by households and
ﬁrms. The government is constrained by the following balanced budget condition:
1 (1 − 1 − 1)+
2 (2 − 2)
(1 + 1)
=0  (52)
Some of the equations that determined equilibrium in the model of Section 1 must be altered to take into





while the government budget constraint (6) becomes (52).
W eb e g i nw i t ht h es i m p l e s tﬁscal stimulus: an increase in current government purchases 1.F o r n o w ,
we set the investment subsidy  to zero. But we will return to it shortly.
6.2 Government Purchases under Flexible Prices
As a benchmark, recall the condition (23) on ﬁscal policy in the ﬂexible-price allocation:
0 ()=0 () for all 
3One can imagine other ﬁscal instruments as well. In particular, a retail sales tax (or subsidy) naturally comes to mind. The
eﬀects of such an instrument in this model depends on what price is assumed to be sticky. If the before-tax price is sticky, then
a sales tax gives policymakers the ability to control directly the after-tax price, which is the price relevant for demand. This in
turn allows policymakers to overcome all the ineﬃciencies that arise from sticky prices. After a decline in aggregate demand, a
cut in the sales tax can reduce prices to the level consistent with full employment. On that other hand, if the after-tax price is
assumed to be sticky, then a sales tax has no use as a short-run stabilization tool.
20The most important implication of this relationship is that public and private consumption move together.
Intuitively, if a shock induces households to save more and spend less, it raises the marginal utility of
consumption. The optimal response of ﬁscal policy under ﬂexible prices is to follow the private sector’s lead
by lowering government expenditure. As a result of the decline in 1, consumption falls less in all periods
than it would have if ﬁscal policy were to remain ﬁxed at its pre-shock levels.



















Under our maintained assumption that 1, optimal government spending falls in response to the negative
shock to future technology 2.
6.3 Government Purchases under Short-run Sticky Prices
Let’s now return to a setting with sticky prices. As shown in expressions (31) and (32), if the economy is
operating below full employment, the equilibrium levels of consumption do not depend on the choice of 1.
That is, as long as some productive resources are idle, an increase in public consumption has an opportunity
cost of zero. Therefore, as long as the marginal utility of government services is positive, the government
should increase spending until the economy reaches full employment.
The government-spending multiplier here is precisely one. This result is akin to the balanced-budget
multiplier in the traditional Keynesian income-expenditure model. Here, as in that model, an increase
in government spending puts idle resources to work and raises income. Consumers, meanwhile, see their
income rise but recognize that their taxes will rise by the same amount to ﬁnance that new, higher level of
government spending. As a result, consumption and investment are unchanged and the increase in income
precisely equals the increase in government spending.4
Formally, one can show that the following ﬁrst-order conditions characterize the government’s optimum:5
0 (1)=20 (2)
0 ()  0 () for all .
4Woodford (2010) discusses how new Keynesian models tend to produce government-spending multipliers that equal unity
if the real interest rate is held constant. In a later section, we present an extension of our model that yields a multiplier greater
than one.
5Readers interested in seeing a more explicit (if laborious) demonstration of these and other results should consult the online
appendix.
21Because government spending puts idle resources to use, optimal spending on public consumption rises above
the point that equates its marginal utility to that of private consumption.6











































One can show that optimal government spending exceeds the level that would be set at the ﬂexible-price




1 . Whether the optimal 

1 is a stimulus relative to pre-shock 1 is
a bit more complicated. For a shock that just barely pushes into the zero lower bound region (that is, 2
equal to or slightly worse than the threshold in expression 48), the optimal 

1 falls below pre-shock 1,
indicating the optimality of ﬁscal contraction. In this case, the central bank has the capacity to oﬀset most
of the shock with conventional monetary easing, and government spending can fall below its pre-shock level
toward its new, lower ﬂexible-price level. For larger shocks, however, optimal 

1 will be greater than
pre-shock 1, indicating the optimality of ﬁscal expansion. In this case, there is a lot of idle capacity for
ﬁscal policy to use up.
One can derive a full set of equations comparing the equilibrium with optimal ﬁscal policy as described




































6One surprising implication is that government consumption in period two also expands beyond the classical benchmark. The
reason is that, according to equation (33), increased second-period government consumption stimulates ﬁrst-period investment.
Why? Intuitively, higher 2 tends to reduce second-period consumption for a given output, which in turn tends to increase
the second-period price level (recall 2 = 22). Higher expected inﬂation would tend to reduce the real interest rate,
stimulating investment. In the ﬁnal equilibrium, however, investment and potential output expand suﬃciently to leave 2 and
2 unaﬀected.
22The bottom line is that when monetary policy fails to achieve full employment, it is optimal for the gov-
ernment to put those idle resources to work by increasing its spending. This ﬁscal policy is second-best,
however, because it fails to produce the same allocation of resources achieved under ﬂexible prices. Public
consumption will be higher in both periods, but private consumption will be lower. As a result, households
will end up with a lower level of welfare.
6.4 Investment Subsidy
Next, we expand the government’s ﬁscal tools by allowing it to subsidize investment by choosing 0.
As with government purchases, the investment subsidy can cause idle capital to be brought into pro-
duction. When output is below its full-employment level in period one, a positive investment subsidy is
welfare-improving. That is true if government spending is unchanged or if it is set to its new ﬂexible-price
optimum. (See the online appendix for details). In general, the subsidy that generates full employment is a
complicated function of the economy’s parameters.
One special case, however, clariﬁes the intuition for the role of the investment subsidy. In much traditional
Keynesian analysis, the real interest rate does not much aﬀect private consumption. We might interpret this
as suggesting that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very small. If we take the limit as  → 0,
then the optimal investment subsidy is:
 = −1 (54)
where 1 is the interest rate chosen in (50) that reproduces the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Government spend-
ing in this equilibrium is once again set on classical principles. Result (54) shows that the government sets
the investment subsidy rate equal to the opposite of the optimal negative nominal interest rate. Intuitively,
the investment subsidy allows the government to provide the same incentives for investment as the negative
interest rate would have, if the latter were possible, thereby reproducing the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.7
For the more general case of positive , we rely on numerical simulations to judge the welfare consequences
of policy change. We oﬀer such calculations in the next section.
6.5 Comparing Welfare Gains to Output Gains from Fiscal Tools
It is common for policy debates to focus on the output stimulus achievable by various policy options. Using
our results above, we now turn to a numerical evaluation of whether this focus on "bang for the buck"
is a good guide to policymaking. As an alternative, we also calculate a welfare-based measure of policy
7The use of tax instruments as a substitute for monetary policy is also examined in recent work by Correia, Farhi, Nicolini,
and Teles (2010).
23eﬀectiveness.
Suppose the economy begins at full employment and the zero lower bound. If it is then hit by a negative
shock to 2, conventional monetary policy is ineﬀective, and we assume that future monetary expansion is
impossible. We want to compare several alternative ﬁscal policies, all aimed at achieving full employment:
• An increase in current government spending 1, holding future government spending 2 constant.
• An increase in both current and future government spending, maintaining the government’s intertem-
poral Euler equation.
• An investment subsidy, holding constant government spending.
• An investment subsidy, allowing government spending to optimally adjust.
These four policies are all compared to a benchmark in which ﬁscal policy is held ﬁxed at its pre-shock
level. For each policy, we calculate a version of what is usually called the "multiplier" or "bang for the
buck." This statistic is the increase in current output (1) divided by the increase in the current government
budget deﬁcit.8 We also calculate a welfare-based measure of the returns to each ﬁscal policy option. In
particular, we calculate the percent increase in current consumption (1) in the benchmark economy that
would raise welfare in the benchmark economy to that under each ﬁscal policy option.
Table 1 shows the results of these calculations for a variety of parameter values. Three parameters are
important to the model. First, our baseline value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is  =0 5,
well within standard ranges for macroeconomic models, and we consider both higher and lower values for
. Second, our baseline value for the household’s relative taste for government consumption is  =0 24.A s
we showed above,  equals the ratio  at the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, and this ratio is 0.24 in the U.S.
national income accounts for 2009. We consider higher and lower values for  as well. Finally, our baseline
v a l u ef o rt h es i z eo ft h es h o c kt of u t u r et e c h n o l o g yi s25%, but we also consider shocks of 10% and 40%.
8The increase in the deﬁcit is calculated as the increase in 1 plus any loss in revenue from the investment subsidy .
Implicitly, this holds current lump-sum tax revenue 1 ﬁxed. Recall that the timing of tax payments is irrelevant to the
equilibrium of the model economy because all households are forward-looking.
24Monetary Policy










Welfare gain 4.1% 4.1% 6.7% 8.5% 8.6%
Bang for the buck 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.6 na
Welfare gain 4.3% 4.9% 12.9% 15.8% 15.9%
Bang for the buck 1.0 1.7 1.2 0.8 na
Welfare gain 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 3.0% 3.0%
Bang for the buck 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.2 na
Welfare gain 4.8% 5.1% 9.1% 10.4% 10.6%
Bang for the buck 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.8 na
Welfare gain 2.9% 2.9% 4.3% 6.6% 6.7%
Bang for the buck 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.4 na
Welfare gain 2.2% 2.3% 2.7% 2.9% 2.9%
Bang for the buck 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.7 na
Welfare gain 4.4% 4.4% 9.5% 16.6% 17.0%





















The results shown in Table 1 suggest that the conventional emphasis on the output multiplier may be
substantially misleading as a guide to optimal policy. In none of the variants considered does the policy with
the largest multiplier also generate the greatest welfare gain.
One pattern is particularly striking: Across all parameter values that we consider, the policy that is
best for welfare (option 4) is the worst according to the bang-for-the-buck metric. The reason is that this
policy recommends a large investment subsidy in the ﬁrst period, generating a deﬁcit nearly twice as large
as the next largest deﬁcit among the other three policies. While generating much less bang for the buck,
this investment subsidy allows policymakers to stabilize output with lower public consumption. This raises
private consumption in both the ﬁrst and second periods, relative to the other policy options, and moves the
economy closer to the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. The ﬁnal column of Table 1 shows that this policy generates
nearly as large a welfare gain as would fully ﬂexible monetary policy.
257 Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Model with Three Periods
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ea d dat h i r dp e r i o dt ot h eb a s e l i n em o d e l .A st h em a i nf e a t u r e so ft h em o d e la r eu n c h a n g e d ,
our purpose in adding a third period is speciﬁc: to expand the set of tools available to the central bank.
The U.S. Federal Reserve has recently pursued policies aimed at lowering long-term nominal interest rates.
Adding a third period to the model allows us to clarify the role of such a policy in stabilizing aggregate
demand.
Three periods implies two nominal interest rates, which we denote 1 and 2.T h ev a r i a b l e2 is a future
short-term interest rate; hence, by standard term-structure relationships, a change in 2 will move long-term
rates in the ﬁrst period in the same direction. The long-term money supply is now denoted 3.W ef o c u s
o nt h ec a s ew h e nt h ep r i c el e v e li np e r i o do n ei sﬁxed; prices are ﬂexible in periods two and three. To keep
things simple, we omit all ﬁscal policy in this section (that is,  =0for all ,s o =0as well).

















1 (1 + 1)(1+2)

This expression shows the monetary policy tools that can oﬀset a shock to aggregate demand. If 1,af a l l
in future productivity (2 or 3) reduces output for a given monetary policy. The central bank has three
tools to oﬀset such a shock. It can lower the current short-term interest rate 1, it can reduce long-term
interest rates by reducing the future short-term rate 2, or it can raise the long-term nominal anchor 3.
Two conclusions about the eﬃcacy of monetary policy are apparent. First, if the long-term nominal
anchor 3 is held ﬁxed, the ability to inﬂuence long-term interest rates expands the central bank’s scope
for restoring the optimal allocation of resources. Formally, one can derive thresholds for 2 above which
conventional and unconventional policies are suﬃcient to restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. One can show
that:
2|−−  2|
Second, as before, if the central bank can control the long-term nominal anchor 3, there is no limit to its
ability to restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.
8 Government Investment
So far, all government spending in this model has been for public consumption. We now consider one way in
which public investment spending might be incorporated into the model. We return to our baseline model
26with two periods, with one addition. In addition to private investment, we also have investment by the
government, denoted . Government consumption is now denoted .












 are the private and public capital stocks, 
 and 
 are exogenous technology parameters
speciﬁct op r i v a t e( ﬁrm) and public (government) capital. The function (·) reﬂects that the two forms of
capital are not perfect substitutes in production. To ensure a sensible interior solution, we assume 0 (·)  0
and 00 (·)  0.
































The ﬁrst three of these should be familiar by now, as they are the same classical conditions as in the baseline
model. The last of these is a new condition showing that optimal ﬁscal policy sets the marginal product of
public capital equal to that of private capital. It implies that the optimal amount of public capital depends






, holding constant the productivity of public capital (
2 ), increases optimal investment in
public capital.


















































































These are close analogues to expressions (31) through (34),m o d i ﬁed to include government investment. If
monetary policy is unrestricted, the central bank can use this solution to derive optimal policy and achieve
the ﬁrst-best ﬂexible-price equilibrium. We focus on the case, however, in which monetary policy is limited,
in order to examine the possible role of ﬁscal policy.
Optimal ﬁscal policy changes surprisingly little with the introduction of government investment. In
particular, it remains true, as in our previous analysis under sticky prices, that










that is, the government increases public consumption beyond where a classical criterion would indicate.
However, conditions (55) and (56) continue to hold. Investment in public capital is still determined by
equating the marginal products of the two types of capital.
One might ask, why doesn’t public investment rise even further to help soak up some of the idle capacity?
It turns out that, in this model, public investment crowds out private investment. In particular, private




















At the optimum, as determined by equation (56), 1
1 = −1 The intuition behind this result is the
following. When the government increases public investment, other things equal, it tends to increase second-
period output and consumption. An increase in second-period consumption for a given money supply tends
to push down second-period prices, raising the ﬁrst-period real interest rate. Private investment falls, leaving













unchanged. As a result, public investment is an ineﬀective
stabilization tool and therefore continues to be set on classical principles.9
As with the baseline model, an investment subsidy can implement the ﬂexible-price optimum in this
model in the limit as  → 0. The optimal subsidy matches the size of the negative nominal interest rate
9The mechanism here resembles Eggertsson’s (2010) "paradox of toil," according to which positive supply-side incentives
reduce expected inﬂation, raise real interest rates, and depress aggregate demand and short-run output.
28that would implement the ﬂexible-price equilibrium if negative rates were available, as in expression (54).
9 Tax policy in a Non-Ricardian Setting
Throughout the analysis so far, households have been assumed to be forward-looking utility maximizers, and
thus their behavior accords with Ricardian equivalence. Changes in tax policy have important eﬀects in the
model if they inﬂuence incentives (as in the case of investment subsidies) but not to the extent that they
merely alter the timing of tax liabilities.
Many economists, however, are skeptical about Ricardian equivalence. Moreover, much evidence suggests
that consumption tracks current income more closely than can be explained by the standard model of
intertemporal optimization. (See, e.g., Campbell and Mankiw 1989). In this subsection, we build non-
Ricardian behavior into our model by assuming that households choose consumption in the ﬁrst period in
part as maximizers and in part as followers of a simple rule of thumb. Such behavior can cause the timing of
taxes to aﬀect the economy’s equilibrium through consumption demand, and it opens new possibilities for
optimal ﬁscal policy.
Formally, a share (1 − ) of each household’s consumption in a given period is determined by what a
maximizing household above would choose, while a share  is set equal to a fraction  of current disposable
income. We denote these two components of consumption 




 = ( − )
and a household’s total consumption is
 =( 1− )
 + 
 
We choose a value for  that sets 
 = 
 prior to any shocks. That is, the proportionality coeﬃcient in
the rule of thumb is assumed to have adjusted so that the level of consumption was initially optimal. But in
response to a shock, households will continue to follow this rule of thumb, potentially causing consumption
to deviate from the utility-maximizing level.
Adding rule-of-thumb behavior has minor implications for the conditions determining equilibrium. The
one equation directly aﬀected by it is the household’s intertemporal Euler condition, where now only the
maximizing component of consumption satisﬁes this condition. As with the analysis of the Ricardian baseline
model, we characterize optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a variety of settings after the economy has
suﬀered an unexpected shock to future technology 2. We assume the budget was balanced (1 = 1)p r i o r
29to the shock.
The ﬁrst result to note is that optimal ﬁscal policy is the same in the ﬂexible-price scenario and in the
ﬁxed-price scenario with fully eﬀective monetary policy. In both cases, output remains at the full-employment
level. This is similar to what we have seen previously. However, in this non-Ricardian model, the optimal
timing of optimal tax policy responds to the shock to 2. To the extent that households follow the rule of
thumb for consumption, they fail to reduce their ﬁrst-period consumption appropriately in response to their
lower wealth. To set ﬁrst-period consumption equal to its optimal value, the government should raise taxes
1.









































The optimal budget balance would be:










In words, a decline in the economy’s wealth due to a reduction in future productivity should induce a budget
surplus. Just as the forward-looking consumers start saving more in response to new circumstances, the
government also tightens its own belt by reducing spending to its ﬂexible-price equilibrium level and setting
taxes above that level, thereby increasing public saving as well.
Now consider the case in which prices are sticky and monetary policy is restricted to a conventional
policy of reducing the short-term interest rate. If the shock to aggregate demand is suﬃciently large, this
monetary policy may be insuﬃcient to restore the economy to full employment and the optimal allocation
of resources. In this case, ﬁscal policy may play a valuable role in increasing aggregate demand.

































Notice that if 0 the timing of taxes inﬂuences equilibrium output. Moreover, the government purchases
multiplier now exceeds unity. Particularly noteworthy is that the government-spending and tax multipliers
30in this model (the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst two terms) resemble those in the traditional Keynesian income-
expenditure model, where  takes the place of the marginal propensity to consume. However, it is not
possible to vary 1 or 1 without also changing some other ﬁscal variable to satisfy the government budget
constraint.
One can show that optimal ﬁscal policy in this setting satisﬁes the following conditions:
0 (1)=0 (1)
0 (1)=20 (2)
These conditions are two of the same classical principles that characterize ﬁscal policy in the baseline ﬂexible-
price equilibrium. There is, however, an important exception: the intertemporal Euler equation for private
consumption is no longer included in the conditions for the optimum. The reason is that when the economy
has idle resources, the real interest rate fails to appropriately reﬂect the price of current relative to future
consumption. Thus, optimal policy in this non-Ricardian setting induces household to consume more than
they would on their own if they were intertemporally maximizing.
To get a better sense for these results, it is useful to compare the optimal allocation in this non-Ricardian
sticky-price model with that in the corresponding Ricardian sticky-price model examined earlier. We denote





























These inequalities show that optimal ﬁscal policy in this non-Ricardian model can move the equilibrium
allocations of consumption and government purchases closer to the baseline ﬂexible-price optimum. In
particular, because the government here can use taxes to stimulate consumption demand, it relies less on
31increases in government purchases.
If we reintroduce the investment subsidy into the model, the results change even more dramatically. In
particular, ﬁscal policymakers now have suﬃcient tools to fully restore the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. The
online appendix shows the proof, but the intuition is straightforward. Because ﬁscal policy can inﬂuence
consumption through the lump-sum tax, investment through the investment subsidy, and government pur-
chases directly, it has complete control over the allocation of resources. When 2 falls, optimal policy in the
ﬁrst period calls for a decrease in government spending (because society is poorer), an increase in taxes (so
the non-Ricardian component of consumption responds appropriately to the lower permanent income), and
an investment subsidy (to stimulate investment spending and aggregate demand). Thus, suﬃciently ﬂexible
ﬁscal policy can yield the ﬁrst-best outcome even when monetary policy cannot.
10 Some Tentative Policy Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to explore optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy for an economy experiencing
a shortfall in aggregate demand. The model we have used is in many ways conventional. It includes short-
run sticky prices, long-run ﬂexible prices, and intertemporal optimization and forward-looking behavior on
the part of ﬁrms and households. It is simple enough to be tractable yet rich enough to oﬀer some useful
guidelines for policymakers. These guidelines are tentative because, after all, our model is only a model. Yet
with this caveat in mind, it will be useful to state the model’s conclusions as clearly and starkly as possible.
One unambiguous implication of the analysis is that how any policy instrument is used depends on which
other instruments are available. To summarize the results, it is fair to say that there is a hierarchy of
instruments for policymakers to take oﬀ the shelf when the economy has insuﬃcient aggregate demand to
maintain full employment of its productive resources.
The ﬁrst level of the hierarchy applies when the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rate is not
binding. In this case, conventional monetary policy is suﬃcient to restore the economy to full employment.
That is, all that is needed is for the central bank to cut the short-term interest rate. Once that monetary
policy is in place, the ﬁscal policy that maximizes the representative household’s welfare is based on classical
principles of cost-beneﬁt analysis, rather than Keynesian principles of demand management. Government
consumption is set to equate its marginal utility with the marginal utility of private consumption. Govern-
ment investment is set to equate its marginal product with the marginal product of private investment.
The second level of the hierarchy applies when the short-term interest rate hits against the zero lower
bound. In this case, unconventional monetary policy becomes the next policy instrument to be used to
restore full employment. A reduction in long-term interest rates may be suﬃcient when a cut in the short-
32term interest rate is not. And an increase the long-term nominal anchor is, in this model, always suﬃcient to
put the economy back on track. This policy might be interpreted, for example, as the central bank targeting
a higher level of nominal GDP growth. With this monetary policy in place, ﬁscal policy remains classically
determined.
The third level of the hierarchy is reached when monetary policy is severely constrained. In particular,
the short-term interest rate has hit the zero bound, and the central bank is unable to commit to future
monetary policy actions. In this case, ﬁscal policy may play a role. The model, however, does not point
toward conventional ﬁscal policy, such as cuts in taxes and increases in government spending, to prop up
aggregate demand. Rather, the ﬁscal policy that maximizes welfare aims at incentivizing interest-sensitive
components of spending, such as investment. In essence, optimal ﬁscal policy tries to do what monetary
policy would if it could.
The fourth and ﬁnal level of the hierarchy is reached when monetary policy is severely constrained
and ﬁscal policymakers rely on only a limited set of ﬁscal tools. If targeted tax policy is for some reason
unavailable, then policymakers may want to expand aggregate demand by increasing government spending,
as well as cutting the overall level of taxation to encourage consumption. In a sense, conventional ﬁscal
policy is the demand management tool of last resort.
11 A Methodological Epilogue
Economists rely on simple models to develop and hone their intuition about how the economy works. When
considering the role of ﬁscal policy for dealing with an economy in recession, the ﬁrst thought of many
economists is the famous income-expenditure model, also known as the “Keynesian cross,” which they
learned as undergraduates. With a minimum of algebra and geometry, the model shows how ﬁscal policy
can increase aggregate demand and thereby close the gap between output and its potential level. Indeed,
some of the more sophisticated econometric models used for macroeconomic policy analysis are founded on
t h el o g i co ft h i ss i m p l em o d e l .
The conventional application of these macroeconomic models for normative purposes, however, is hard
to reconcile with more basic economic principles. Ultimately, all policy should aim to improve some measure
of welfare, such as the utility of the typical individual in society. The output gap matters not in itself but
rather because it must in some way be an input into welfare.
A common aphorism (often attributed to James Tobin) is that “it takes a heap of Harberger triangles to
ﬁll an Okun’s gap.”10 The saying is invoked to suggest that when the economy is suﬀering from the eﬀects
10For economists under the age of 40, who may be less familiar with these archaic terms, maybe we should explain. A
33of recession, microeconomic ineﬃciencies should become a lower priority than bringing the economy back
to potential. This conclusion, however, may be too glib. Policymakers have various tools at their disposal
with which they can inﬂuence aggregate demand. Which tools they use to bring the economy back to full
employment can profoundly inﬂuence the level of welfare achieved. That is, welfare is a function of both
Okun’s gaps and Harberger triangles, and policymakers need to be mindful of this fact when they conduct
demand management.
The policy guidelines we have derived in this paper are based on the standard tools of welfare economics.
Much debate over ﬁscal policy compares the policy alternatives using metrics that are quite diﬀerent from
a welfare measure. In particular, the commonly used “bang for the buck,” which measures how much GDP
rises for each dollar added to the budget deﬁcit, is a potentially misleading guide to evaluating alternative
policies. The reason is that welfare depends not only on the level of output, but also on its composition
among the various components of spending. In other words, policymakers should aim to close the Okun’s
gap not at the smallest budgetary cost but, instead, while creating the smallest Harberger triangles.
Finally, we ﬁnish by reminding the reader that our speciﬁc policy conclusions are based on a particularly
simple model. We have chosen this approach because simple models can clarify thinking more powerfully
than complex ones. Our model includes those elements that we believe are most crucial for the topic at
hand. But there is no doubt that many features of the real economy have been left out. To be speciﬁc: We
have not included ﬁnancial frictions and problems of ﬁnancial intermediation. We have not incorporated
any open-economy features. We have lump-sum rather than distortionary taxes. We have no uncertainty.
We incorporate sticky prices, but we do not take into account that ﬁrms’ price setting is staggered or that
diﬀerent sectors may have diﬀerent degrees of price rigidity. We have not formally modeled the political
process that allows some policy tools to be used more easily than others. Future work may well modify our
framework and, in doing so, call some of our tentative conclusions into question. We hope that the simple
and transparent model presented here provides a useful starting point for those future investigations.
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